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Thinking Like a Statistician
The Report of the American Statistical Association
Committee on Training in Statistics in
Selected Professions
David H. Kaye
Legal scholars are flirts, or rather, some are. They flirt with one discipline
after another, learning a little, distorting a little, and discerning-they say-
a lot. At one time, it seemed that law and psychology were threatening to
engulf the field of criminal law. In recent years, moral philosophy has
infused writing on constitutional law with a new vocabulary. In many
subjects, economic analysis has become an apparently indispensable working
tool of legal scholarship. Even sociobiology has crept into a few niches in
this hospitable environment.
The impetus for many of these interdisciplinary movements has come
mostly from legal theoreticians. The application of statistical theory to legal
analysis and proof is a different matter. Much recent interest in applying
probability and statistics to legal matters has come out of the trenches, from
developments in legal practice. Increasingly, in certain fields of practice,
statistical argument has become part of the armamentarium of the attorney.
Some courts have chastised the parties for using inferior statistical methods,1
and some members of the bar, in turn, have criticized the law schools for
"failing to teach quantification skills."
2
In 1983, a subcommittee of the American Statistical Association composed
of legal educators and one judge3 issued a report describing existing
David H. Kaye is Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
1. Coble v. Hot Springs School District No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1982).
2. A.B.A. Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Bench and Bar Look at Legal
Education, Syllabus, November 1981, at 12, 6.
3. The members of the subcommittee were Robert Charrow, University of Cincinnati School
of Law; Richard 0. Lempert, University of Michigan School of Law; Jack B. Weinstein,
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York;
Stanton Wheeler, Yale University Department of Sociology and Yale Law School; and
Franklin E. Zimring, Director, Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of
Chicago School of Law. The author of this article served as the chair of the subcommittee.
The chairperson of the American Statistical Association's Committee on Training in
Selected Professions is George T. Duncan, School of Urban and Public Affairs, earnegie-
Mellon University.
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programs for educating law students in statistics and offering recommenda-
tions for improving these programs. This article summarizes that report.4
1. The Need for Statistical Expertise in Law
The subcommittee's argument for formal statistical training in legal
education is straightforward. "The life of the law," Oliver Wendell Holmes
once wrote, "has not been logic: it has been experience." 5 Certainly, law is
not a closed, deductive system. It is concerned with governing and
coordinating human behavior. To be effective, it must assimilate and build
on sound knowledge from a broad spectrum of disciplines. In appropriate
circumstances, legislators, attorneys, judges, and legal scholars should and
do draw on many sources of information. Although the profession has a
fondness for anecdote and introspection (partly because in many matters of
legal interest no better information is available), it also relies, with
increasing frequency, on more systematic forms of empirical research. The
discipline of statistics is concerned with organizing and analyzing the data
from such research. Techniques of descriptive and inferential statistics offer
systematic means for making sense of and drawing conclusions from past
experience.
More specifically, the subcommittee identified the following as matters
requiring statistical expertise that are important to the legal system:
scientific and statistical evidence prepared for specific proceedings; program
evaluation; psychological, sociological and economic studies; public health
and epidemiologic data and studies; social and economic data.
II. Existing Training Programs for the Legal Profession
A. Education Available to Law Students
The time has passed when students entering law school could confidently
assume that they had put all quantitative analysis behind them. But what is
the extent of curricular offerings in statistics in law schools? To answer this
question, the subcommittee wrote to the deans of all schools (170) approved
by the American Bar Association as of 1981. It asked them to indicate which
of the following three conditions applied at their schools (and to comment as
they saw fit):
Response 1: Statistical theory or methods are taught in a class (or classes) specifically devoted to
the subject.
Response 2: Statistical theory or methods are taught to some extent in a class (or classes) devoted
to a broader or related subject.
Response 3: Statistical theory or methods are not taught in any of our classes.
4. For those interested in greater detail, a copy of the report may be obtained by writing the
author.
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 5th printing, (Boston, 1923).
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After some prodding, 151 schools (90 percent) responded. 6 Figure A displays
the pattern of these responses.
Figure A. Distribution of responses
to law school curriculum census
Response Frequency
l and 2 ++ 7, or 5 percent
1 only ++ 8, or 5 percent
2 only ++++++++ 22, or 15 percent
3 only +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 115, or 76 percent
About three-quarters (115) of the responding law schools provide no
training in statistical theory or methods. The proportion for all law schools
(including the ones not approved by the A.B.A. and therefore not contacted
as well as the ones contacted but not responding to the census) almost
certainly exceeds this figure. A few schools, such as the Harvard Law School,
explained that law students had access to statistics classes at other units in
the university. None indicated how frequently their students exercise this
option.
About one-quarter (36) of the responding law schools say they have (or
plan to have) some course offering that includes some instruction in
statistical theory or methods (Response 1 or 2). Both public and private, and
large and small enrollment institutions are well represented. The group
seems to be above average with respect to one measure of the prestige of its
members.
7
A smaller group of 15 schools (about 10 percent) report a course offering
whose central focus is statistical methodology (Response 1). These schools
also include large and small, and public and private institutions. They tend
to occupy high positions in the law school "pecking order," but not all
highly rated law schools are included.8 From their description, these courses,
6. Public and private, large and small, highly selective and less selective, and high and low
"prestige" schools can be found among the nonrespondents. However, when the distribu-
tion of the rankings described at note 7 for nonrespondents is compared to that of the
responding law schools, it appears that the nonrespondents tend to be drawn from the
bottom half of the perceived hierarchy of law schools.
7. Efforts to assess the quality of professional schools, whether by objective criteria or by
opinion polls, are perilous. Scott Van Alstyne, Ranking the Law Schools: The Reality of
Illusion? 1982 Am. B. Found. Research J. 649-84. Since most proposed criteria tend to be
highly correlated with one another and because the subcommittee sought to characterize a
pattern rather than to determine the status of any particular school, it simply looked to the
rankings in the Cartte" Report on the Leading Schools of Education, Law, and Business,
Change (February 1977), at 44. This poll of law school deans (which had a response rate of
only 52 percent) classified the "top" ninety law schools into nine groups of ten. The median
group ranking for the schools reporting some instruction in statistics is 4.5, which
compares favorably to the median of 8.5 that characterizes all 170 accredited law schools.
8. The median of the Cartter Report group ratings of these law schools is 2.5. The distribution
is shown below:
+ +
+o + + + 4 +
Group rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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for the most part, seem comparable to a condensed, introductory under-
graduate applied probability and statistics course for students who have no
knowledge of calculus. Not surprisingly, the emphasis appears to be on
applications to legal problems. Most of these courses apparently are taught
by law professors, while others are taught by social scientists. A few, such as
one offered in alternate years at the University of Chicago, are taught by
statisticians.
The 32 courses that include some instruction in statistics but are not
primarily devoted to the subject (Response 2) included law and economics
(5), law and social science or social science methods (12), law and psychology
(4), employment discrimination (8), and evidence (3). A few schools said that
such classes as antitrust, civil procedure, contracts, and criminal law include
instruction in statistical concepts.
In sum, instruction for law students in statistical methods or theory
appears to be the exception rather than the norm in law schools. Of course,
some students may have had training in statistics in undergraduate or
graduate study, but the reason most law schools do not include such
instruction in their curriculum is probably not that they fear it would be
redundant.
B. Education Available to Practicing Attorneys
Unfortunately, the subcommittee did not study the extent of instruction in
statistics directed at practicing attorneys or judges. Some Continuing Legal
Education courses probably include discussions of applications of statistics
to law, as for example in the employment discrimination area. Symposia or
workshops sponsored by private institutions may also give attorneys some
exposure to statistical developments. Although the subcommittee presented
almost no information on such postgraduate education, these efforts, while
valuable in other ways, probably do not constitute systematic, sustained, or
widely available instruction in statistics for attorneys.
III. What Lawyers Should Know About Statistics
Because attorneys practice law, not statistics, the subcommittee reasoned
that it is more important for them to be critical consumers of statistical
arguments than to be statisticians in their own right. The subcommittee
suggested that law school graduates should be competent users of descriptive
statistics and graphical presentations and that they should understand the
basic features of experimental design, survey techniques, statistical inference,
and cost-benefit analysis.
IV. Recommended Training Programs for Law Students
In considering the training law students ought to have in statistics, the
subcommittee asked how much, where and when. It concluded that the
minimum academic training available to law students should equal two
semester hours of a basic course in applied probability and statistics. It also
suggested that the ability to select and utilize expert statistical advice should
be cultivated-in clinical or evidence-related courses, if not in an introduc-
tory law school course in statistics itself.
Thinking Like a Statistician
As to where and when law students should obtain such training, the
subcommittee observed that a law school might choose to make an applied
statistics course taught in a department of mathematics or statistics a
prerequisite to a law school course or seminar on legal applications or
clinical instruction in coping with expert statistical testimony. This would
help ensure that students have a reasonably thorough introduction to basic
statistical methods as well as some exposure to any special features of
statistical assessments in law.
Insisting on particular prelaw courses, however, would be a major
departure from present practice, and the subcommittee did not insist that the
completion of an applied statistics course of the sort designed for mathe-
matics and science majors is essential. An alternative is for the law school to
offer its own core course. In some respects, this course might be something
like a music appreciation course. The students need not train to be
composers or soloists, but they should leave the course able to distinguish
among a virtuoso performance, an acceptable rendition, and a bad technique.
At the same time, attorneys should be prepared to make some statistical
assessments of their own. They should realize, for example, that a mean is
not generally the same as a median, and they should be able to decide which
measure of central tendency is the most revealing for a given application. In
terms of the musical metaphor, they are not merely passive listeners, but
modest performers. A demonstrated ability to work simple problems may be
necessary to acquire this statistics "appreciation and usage" skill, but the
law school course could focus from the outset on the legal applications. For
instance, the subcommittee pointed out that such a course might cover the
following topics:
The meaning of probability: frequentist, personalist, and other interpretations; their appli-
cability to proof in the courtroom;
The rules of probability: independent and dependent events; conditional probability; Bayes'
rule;
Random variables and probability distributions: the binomial distribution; the normal
distribution;
Describing data: graphical methods of exploratory data analysis; frequency distributions;
measures of central tendency and of variability;
Populations and samples: sampling methods; experimental design; bias and the advantages of
random sampling;
Sampling distributions: the sampling distribution of the sample mean; types of error;
Likelihood functions: Bayesian inference;
Decision theory: the legal standards of proof;
Multivariate methods: regression and analysis of variance; correlation and causation.
Perhaps optimistically, the subcommittee opined that a well-designed core
course can cover these topics, at an introductory level suited to law students
and their needs, in one semester. It suggested that where a law school's
resources permit it, the law-trained instructor might teach the class together
with a statistician or other individual broadly trained in statistics.
Although the report tends to treat the fundamentals of probability and
statistics as matters to be taught in their own right, the subcommittee did not
insist that this is the only way to teach material considered useful to lawyers
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or that no law student would be fit to practice without academic credit in a
statistics course. It spoke of "interstitial" treatment of these topics as a
possible way to convey some material. In addition, despite the role of
statistical proof in certain specialized fields such as trademark and unfair
competition and employment discrimination, it recognized that many
lawyers can serve their clients quite well without resorting to anything more
than rather simple statistical concepts in their daily practice.
Nevertheless, the committee emphasized that statistical thinking is both a
valuable part of a general liberal arts education and a useful skill in legal
planning and litigation. Law schools, it said, should make special efforts to
encourage and facilitate the study of statistics. Such efforts may include
publicizing for the students the kinds of practice that will require them to
have more than an intelligent layman's knowledge of statistics, giving law
school course credit to students who successfully complete courses in
statistics outside the law school, offering statistics courses within the law
school, and dealing with statistical concepts as they arise in such traditional
law school subjects.as torts, constitutional law, criminal law, and evidence.
V. Summary of Recommendations
The bottom line of the report is its summary of recommendations to legal
educators:
Law schools, in advising undergraduates about good preparatory courses for law school, should
include applied probability and statistics in their recommendations.
Law schools should offer instruction in legal applications of statistics, including some clinical
training in dealing with experts.
Law schools that do not themselves offer an introductory survey course in statistics should
award academic credit to a law student without prior training in statistics who successfully
completes an undergraduate class in the subject.
Law schools that offer an introductory course in statistics should consider staffing the course
with a person trained in statistics as well as a person trained in law.
